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explanationist	 account	 of	 epistemic	 coincidence	—	one	 according	 to	
which,	roughly,	beliefs	are	non-coincidentally	true	if	and	only	if	they	




This	 paper	 contains	 both	 positive	 arguments	 for	 explanationism	
and	negative	arguments	against	its	competitors.	But	the	relationship	
between	these	elements	is	tighter	than	typical.	I	aim	to	show	not	only	




about	 epistemic	 coincidence	has	 trended	 in	 the	 right	 direction	—	to-
wards	explanationism	—	but	where	success	has	been	blocked	by	a	se-
ries	of	understandable	missteps.
1. Narrative Roadmap 
Causal	theories	(e.g.,	Goldman	1967)	were	amongst	the	earliest	post-
Gettier	 (1963)	 attempts	 to	analyze	knowledge.	Though	 they	are	not	
typically	presented	as	such,	we	can	easily	draw	from	them	an	account	
of	epistemic	coincidence.	Such	causationism	holds,	roughly,	that	beliefs	




2.	 I	phrase	 it	 this	way,	 rather	 than	 in	 terms	of	a	necessary	 condition	 for	epis-
temic	coincidence,	because	I	find	it	more	intuitive,	but	obviously	the	two	are	
equivalent.
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5.	 Proponents	 of	modal	 conditions	 include	 Black	 (2008),	 Black	 and	Murphy	
(2007),	Clarke-Doane	(2012,	2014,	2015,	2016),	DeRose	(1995),	Dretske	(1971),	
Ichikawa	 (2011),	 Luper-Foy	 (1984),	 Nozick	 (1981),	 Pritchard	 (2007,	 2009),	
Roush	 (2005),	Sainsbury	 (1997),	Sosa	 (1999a,	 1999b,	2007,	2009),	 and	Wil-
liamson	(2002),	among	others.	It	is	not	always	clear	whether	these	authors	





2. Two Failures of Causationism
Begin	with	a	classic	Gettier	case:8














What	 precisely	 makes	 this	 and	 others	 cases	 of	 epistemic	 coinci-
dence?	 It	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	 ‘coincidence’	 is	 not	meant	 to	 be	
a	 term	of	 art	here,	but	 rather	 serves	 to	 reflect	 common,	pretheoreti-
cal	intuitions	about	what’s	gone	wrong	in	Gettier	cases.	Given	this,	it	












Again,	 the	 literature	 has	 not	 followed	me	 in	 this.	Many	 philoso-
phers	treat	counterfactual	conditions	as	direct	representatives	of	the	
intuitions	 behind	 our	 judgements	 about	 epistemic	 coincidence.	 In-






istence	 of	 coincidence	 contrasts	 where	 all	 explanatory	 relations	 be-
tween	beliefs	and	truth	appear	to	be	the	same.	The	most	famous	ex-
ample	here	is	Goldman’s	(1976)	fake	barn	case,	which	he	himself	takes	



























cases	 are	non-coincidental.	 (This	 anticipates	 a	 problematic	modalist	
strategy	discussed	in	§5.1.)	But	this	won’t	do,	because	we	intuitively	








Good Math	 	 	 Lisa	 comes	 to	 believe	 that	 89	 is	 a	 prime	
number	 because	 she	 goes	 through	 its	 possible	 factors	
and,	through	accurate	calculation,	determines	that	89	has	
precisely	two	factors:	1	and	itself.
Intuitively,	 Bad Math	 is	 a	 case	 of	 epistemic	 coincidence,	 while	
Good Math	 is	not.13	Given	the	common	assumption	that	facts	about	
which	numbers	 are	prime	are	 causally	 impotent,	 there	 is	 simply	no	
way	for	causationists	to	vindicate	both	judgements.	
I	will	call	contrasts	 like	that	between	Bad Math	and	Good Math 
“no-causal-connection	 coincidence	 contrasts”,	 or	 “no-cause	 contrasts”	
for	 short.	 The	 existence	 of	 no-cause	 contrasts	 illuminates	 a	 funda-









tal	 cousins.	 Bertie’s	 belief	 is	 caused	by	 the	 fact	 that	 her	 clock	 reads	












pendent	 truths	—	e.g.,	on	many	accounts,	 those	of	mathematics	 and	
ethics.12	 If	 causal	 connection	 to	 the	 truth	 is	 required	 for	 knowledge,	
and	causal	connection	to	some	truths	is	impossible,	then	knowledge	
of	those	truths	is	impossible.
10.	 This	 definition	 comes	 from	 Google’s	 in-engine	 dictionary.	 Other	 defini-












12.	 The	mind-independence	 ensures	 that	 a	 causal	 connection	 cannot	 run	 the	
other	way:	our	beliefs	cannot	cause	the	truth.	Causal	inefficacy	and	mind-in-
dependence	are	contentious	in	both	metaethics	and	the	philosophy	of	math-
ematics,	but	 so	 long	as	we	have	—	or	even	 just	wish	 to	 theorize	about	 the	
possibility	 of	—	knowledge	 in	 some	domains	of	 causally	 inefficacious,	mind-
independent	truth,	the	problem	stands.
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modal	differences:	pure	mathematical	truths	are	necessary,	and	there-





Begin	 with	 a	 mathematical	 coincidence	 contrast,	 using	 two	 of	
Lange’s	examples:














[L]et	a, a + d, a	+	2d	be	any	three	integers	 in	arithmetic	
progression.	Then	



















knows	 that	what	 she	 is	 seeing	 is	 either	 a	 sheep-façade	
or	the	one	local	sheep,	and	that	whenever	the	former	is	
present,	the	latter	is	hiding	behind	it.	
Intuitively,	Bad Sheep	 is	 a	 case	 of	 epistemic	 coincidence,	 while	
Good Sheep	is	not.	Yet	arguably	Mary’s	and	Bo’s	beliefs	bear	the	same	
causal	connection	to	the	truth.	The	apparent	existence	of	such	same-





losophers	 distinguish	 coincidences	 from	 non-coincidences	 in	 other	
contexts	 involving	 causally	 inefficacious	 truths.	Mathematicians,	 for	
example,	describe	 some	 sets	of	mathematical	 truths	 as	 coincidental,	
others	as	non-coincidental.	Yet	there	are	no	differences	in	causal	rela-
tion	between	sets	of	pure	mathematical	truths.14	(There	are	likewise	no	
14.	 They	 are	 also	 not	 “concurrence[s]	 of	 events	 or	 circumstances”	—	another	
overly	narrow	aspect	of	the	dictionary	definition.

















ing	 be	 adapted	 as	 a	 sufficient	 condition	 for	 coincidence	 generally?	
Consider	 the	 conditions	 under	which	 the	Minsk	 case	would	 either	





explaining	one	 component	 can	be	 expanded	 to	 cover	 another	 component	
merely	 by	 removing	 an	 otiose	 restriction,	 or	 only	 by	 adding	 some	 slight	





































16.	 I	 say	 “may”	because	 it	 is	not	 clear	 that	 all	 such	 conjunctions	 constitute	ex-
planations.	Relatedly,	Lange	distinguishes	unified	explanations	from	unified	

















mended	by	 the	same	underlying	 thought	as	 (a).	They	 represent	 the	
two	ways	in	which	there	can	be	an	explanatory connection between	the	
members	of	a	set:	(a)	through	a	shared	relation	to	something	outside	
the	 set	or	 (b)	 through	 internal	 relations	within	 it.22	Coincidence	ob-
tains	where	 there	 is	no	 such	connection.	 In	 the	epistemic	 case,	 this	
gives	us:	
Explanationist	 	 	 For	any	 true	belief	B	and	 truth	 it	 con-
cerns	T,	 B	 is	 coincidentally true	 if	 (a)	 there	 is	 no	unified	
explanation	for	B	and	T;	(b)	T	does	not	explain	B;	and	(c)	
B	does	not	explain	T.23
22.	 Lange	anticipates	 this	development:	 “[S]uppose	 that	one	 component	 [of	 a	
potential	mathematical	 coincidence]	 is	 a	mathematical	 axiom.	 Perhaps	 an	
axiom	has	no	explanation.	But	the	fact	that	all	of	those	components	are	true	
is	not	then	obviously	coincidental	—	especially in a case where the axiom explains 





















obtains	 if	 there	 is	no	unified	explanation	 for	all	elements	of	 the	set	


























21.	 If	 I	 am	 there	because	of	 you,	 then	by	 the	 transitivity	of	 explanation,	what-
ever	 explains	 your	 presence	 explains	mine.	 But	 the	 view	 should	 not	 turn	
on	whether	 there	 is	such	 transitivity.	The	unified-explanation	account	also	
won’t	work	in	cases	where	at	least	one	element	of	the	apparent	coincidence	
is	a	 fundamental	 fact,	unless	fundamental	 facts	explain	themselves	—	again,	
something	the	view	should	not	turn	on.
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to	explain the reliability of	our	mathematical	beliefs.	He	begins	with	his	
titular	question:
What	 is	 the	 Benacerraf	 Problem?	 There	 does	 not	 seem	
to	be	a	 satisfying	answer.	There	does	not	 seem	 to	be	a	













truth	 is	 coincidental	 in	a	malignant	 sense.	What	 is	 that	
sense?	 It	 is	arguably	precisely	 the	sense	 in	which	 learn-
ing	 that	 the	 truth	of	one’s	beliefs	 is	 coincidental	would	
undermine	them.	If	this	is	correct,	then	there	is	a	“transla-
tion	scheme”	between	 the	claim	that	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	

















nection	between	 the	 fact	 that	89	 is	prime	and	Lisa’s	belief	 in	Good 
Math,	there	must	be	some	explanatory	connection	—	one	absent	in	Bad 
Math.
Indeed,	 I	do	not	 think	 there	are	 any	non-coincidental	 cases	with-
out	explanatory	connections.	The	best	evidence	for	this,	I	contend,	is	














tainly	suggestive	—	there	 is	 frequent	 talk,	 for	 instance,	of	 “links”	and	
“connections”.	 What’s	 more,	 modalism	 renders	 these	 challenges	 in-
comprehensible	in	domains	of	purportedly	necessary	truth	like	math-
ematics	 and	 ethics,	 a	 claim	 argued	 for	—	strikingly,	 championed — by	
some	 modalists.	 Consider	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 last	 in	 a	 series	 of	
recent,	 influential	 papers	 by	 Justin	 Clarke-Doane	 (2012,	 2014,	 2015,	
2016),	wherein	he	understands	the	Benacerraf	Problem	as	a	challenge	













some	 third	 factor	might	 explain	 both.24	 The	 affinities	with	 Explana-
tionist	are	beyond	striking;	these	are	precisely	the	ways	Explanation-
ist	offers	 for	 avoiding	 (or	 lessening)	 epistemic	 coincidence.25	These	
framings	retain	the	intuitive	force	of	the	Benacerraf	Problem	and	its	









In	 the	 next	 section,	 I	 argue	 that	 there	 are coincidence	 con-
trasts	 where	 all	 modal	 relations	 between	 beliefs	 and	 truth	 are	 the	
same	—	“same-modality	 contrasts”	—	and	 that	 modalism	 therefore	















our	beliefs	depend	on	the	facts	about	electrons	in such a 
way that	the	correlation	of	our	believing	the	sentence	‘p’	
and	its	being	the	case	that	p	would	be	maintained	given	
a	 variation	 in	 the	 facts	 about	 electrons.	 It	 is	 this type of 
counterfactual	 dependence	 that	 needs	 explaining,	 not	
counterfactual	dependence	by	itself.	But	now,	if	the	intel-













nection	 from	 the	first	 factor	 to	 the	 second,	 or	 from	 the	
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We	 can	 reinforce	 Lewis’	 rejection	 of	 such	 “trivial	 infallibility”	 by	
considering	 the	 similarities	 between	 sensitivity	 and	 simple	 counter-
factual	models	of	causation.	For	example:
[W]e	may	define	a	cause	to	be	an object, followed by another 




















cleanup	 of	 causationism	 and,	 second,	 by	 Clarke-Doane.	 The	 argu-
ments	to	come	follow	these	predictions.
5.  Same-Modality Contrasts and the Failure of Modalism
5.1 The Lewis and Clarke-Doane Expedition26
Clarke-Doane’s	argument	begins	with	sensitivity.	Beliefs	are	sensitive	
just	in	case	they	are	true	and,	had	the	relevant	truths	been	different,	


































and our beliefs	fail	to	account	for	coincidences	involving	necessarily held 






status	 outstrip	 modal	 differences.	 It	 follows	 that	 modalism	 cannot	
accommodate	 all	 judgements	 about	 epistemic	 coincidence	—	as	 pre-
dicted,	for	much	the	same	reasons	of	narrowness	as	causationism.
5.2 A Same-Modality Contrast
In	this	section,	I	construct	a	same-modality	contrast.	I	do	so	slowly,	to	
























in	metaethics	 (e.g.,	Street	2006)	as	 close	 relatives	of	 the	Benacerraf	
Problem.	 These	 arguments	 begin	with	 the	 premise	 that	 there	 is	 an	




explanation	may	well	 ensure	 that	 our	 ethical	 beliefs	 couldn’t	 easily	
have	been	different,	and	thus	that	they	are	safe.
Modalists	unfriendly	 to	Clarke-Doane’s	 conclusion	may	 try	 to	 re-
sist	by	developing	an	account	of	proximity	allowing	for	nearby	worlds	
where	 our	 beliefs	 are	 different,	 either	 because	 evolutionary	 forces	
produce	different	beliefs,	or	because	our	beliefs	are	not	explained	by	
evolutionary	forces	(e.g.,	Warren	and	Waxman	m.s.).30	Unfortunately,	

















proposal	 if	 ‘probabilistic	dependence’	were	 interpreted	modally.	My	strong	
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trustworthy	 friend,	or	even	 that	 the	Source	has	given	Eula	 indepen-
dently	 verified	 information	 in	 the	 past.	With	 or	without	 such	 stipu-
lations,	 it	remains	 indeterminate	whether	JTB	 is	a	case	of	epistemic	
coincidence.	
The	 next	 step	 is	 to	 develop	 the	 case	 so	 that	 Eula	meets	 any	 po-
tentially	relevant	modal	condition.	I’ve	already	explained	how	we	can	
do	 this:	we	 just	need	 to	 stipulate	 that	 the	 relevant	 truths	are	neces-





worthy.	 Eula	 consults	 the	 Source	 to	 form	 some	 beliefs	
about	which	numbers	 are	 prime.	All	 of	 Eula’s	 resultant	



























worthy	 [except	 possibly	 for	 evidence	 of	 epistemic	 coin-
cidence].	Eula	consults	 the	Source	to	form	some	beliefs	
































the	 actual	 world.	 [There	 is	 no	 explanatory	 connection	
between	 this	modal	 stability	 and	 the	 facts	 about	which	
numbers	are	prime.]
And	we	can	contrast	this	with	a	variation	on	Good Math:




and	 only	 if	 she	 determines	 that	 they	 have	 exactly	 two	
factors:	1	and	themselves.	There	is	no	available	evidence	
that	 this	 is	 an	untrustworthy	method.	Lisa	 consults	 the	
Source	 to	 form	beliefs	about	which	numbers	are	prime.	
All	 of	 Lisa’s	 resultant	 beliefs	 are	 true;	 and	 there	 is	 no	
good	evidence	 to	 the	 contrary.	At	 every	possible	world,	
Lisa’s	counterpart	forms	beliefs	about	which	numbers	are	






















































stood	in	terms	of	a	modal	condition	on arbitrarily defined sets of beliefs. 
The	possibility	remains	that	we	can	salvage	modalism	by	picking	out	
sets	of	beliefs	in	some	particular	way	—	say,	by	examining	the	modal	














‘Epistemic	 coincidence’	 is	not	merely	 equivocal	between	modal	 and	
explanatory	conceptions;	it	is	not	like	river	‘bank’	and	financial	‘bank’.	
A	successful	account	—	disjunctive	or	otherwise	—	must	accommodate,	
if	 not	 explain,	 this	 deeper	 relation;	 the	 view	 cannot	 be	 that	 contin-
gent	coincidences	are	modal	phenomena,	necessary	coincidences	are	
38.	One	could	instead	try	to	salvage	modalism	by	appealing	to	modal	variation	







could	 consistently	 get	 things	 right	 by	 chance.	 But	 that	 is	 neither	 here	nor	
there;	the	point	is	that	if	it	did,	Eula’s	beliefs	would	be	coincidentally	true.
Here	is	a	related	worry	I	suspect	some	readers	will	have:	Bad Ne-
cessity	 and	Good Necessity	might	 seem	 too	 schematic,	 convoluted,	
bizarre,	 or	 precious	 for	 readers	 to	 have	 any	 (probative)	 intuitions	
about	them.	My	reply	is	that	most	of	what	goes	on	in	these	cases	is	
irrelevant	to	our	judgements	about	epistemic	coincidence.	The	stipu-
























37.	 One	might	 claim	 that	 the	modal	 stability	 of	 her	 using	 the	method	 is	 best	
explained	by	 its	being	 connected	 to	 the	 truth.	That	poses	no	 threat	 to	my	
position;	 it	 is	squarely	 in	 line	with	 the	 idea	 that	modal	conditions	provide	
evidence	of	explanatory	connections.












and	which	has	 typically	been	accurate.	The	 clock	 reads	
“10:00”	 because	 it	 is	 10:00.	 However,	 the	 clock	 breaks	
thirty	seconds	after	Russ	consults	it,	just	before	10:01.






by	10:01	Russ’	 clock	 is	broken	and	he	would	 falsely	believe	 it	 to	be	
10:00.	
What	 could	motivate	 focusing	on	 the	9:59-world	 rather	 than	 the	
10:01-world?	Counterfactualists	must	claim	 that	 the	 former	 is	closer.	
But	on	what	grounds?	They	could	argue	that	the	9:59-world	is	closer	





41.	 This	 follows	 the	 standard	 idea	 that	 world-proximity	 is	 a	 function	 of	
world-similarity.
explanatory	phenomena,	and that’s an end to the matter. I	can	think	of	no	
plausible	modalist	account	of	this	relation.
For	 the	 simple	 causationist	 introduced	 above,	where	 there	 is	 no	
causation,	 there	are	no	coincidences.	 For	modalists,	 “where	 there	 is	
no	contingency,	there	are	no	coincidences”	(Wielenberg	2010,	461,	em-
phasis	mine).	 The	 former	 is	 a	 bug	 because	 it	 fails	 to	 accommodate	
no-cause	 contrasts.	 The	 latter	 is	 a	 bug	 because	 it	 fails	 to	 accommo-




Modalism	 fails	 because	 it	 cannot	 accommodate	 same-modality	 con-
trasts.	My	 view	 is	 that	 this	 is	 because	 intuitions	 about	 coincidence	

























Lewis	 is	 assuming	 a	 controversial	 connection	 between	
counterfactuals	and	necessity.	…	[E]ven	those	who	think	





The	 truths	 of	 pure	 mathematics	 are	 presumably	 meta-
physically	 necessary	 truths,	 but	we	 can	 coherently	 sup-
pose	 many	 of	 them	 to	 be	 false	 by	 considering	 worlds	
in	which	 there	are	no	mathematical	objects	of	any	 sort,	
worlds	in	which	all	sets	are	finite,	and	so	on.	Many	of	our	













weren’t	 prime,	 the	 conditions	 for	 life	wouldn’t	 obtain,	 and	 so	 neither	 Leo	
nor	 Lisa	would	 believe	 anything	 at	 all.	 Or,	more	 relevantly	 to	 our	 discus-
sion,	suppose	it	 turns	out	that	 it	 is	no	mathematical	coincidence	that	89	 is	

































42.	 Note	 that	 a	 counterfactualist	 who	 disagrees	with	me	 and	 takes	 this	 to	 be	
a	 case	 of	 epistemic	 coincidence	 would	 similarly	 need	 to	 explain	 why	 the	
10:01-world	is	closer.
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explanationist	 has	what	 is	 by	 comparison	 a	 clear,	 simple	 story:	 our	





6.2 Hypermodals and Hope
In	this	section,	I	raise	two	methodological	concerns	about	the	use	of	
counterfactual,	 and	 specifically	 hypermodal,	 conditions	 given	 expla-
nationism,	and	say	a	bit	about	how	I	think	we	should	proceed.
First,	 given	explanationism,	we	 can	 rely	on	 counterfactual	 condi-
tions	 only	where	 all	 relevant	 explanatory	 relations	 can	be	modeled	
counterfactually.	Whether	this	will	always	be	the	case	is	a	point	of	con-
tention	amongst	metaphysicians	and	philosophers	of	science	working	
on	explanation.	 It	 seems	 to	me	 that	 those	of	us	not	working	 in	 the	
relevant	areas	should	be	wary	of	sticking	our	necks	out	further	than	
necessary.




















































































Combining	 these	 concerns:	 if	 developing	 hypermodal	 condi-
tions	requires	counterfactual	models	of	all	relevant	forms	of	explana-
tion	—	the	 availability	 of	which	 is	 far	 from	 certain	—	and	developing	
such	conditions	requires	an	implicit	or	explicit	account	of	non-causal	
explanation	 anyway,	 relying	 too	 heavily	 on	 these	 conditions	 seems	
both	 theoretically	 and	dialectically	 inadvisable.45	This	 is	not	 just	be-
cause	 such	 conditions	might	 trivialize	matters	 as	modal	 conditions	
have,	but	because	they	may	in	fact	lead	us	towards	unwarranted	pessi-
mism.	Recall	Rosen’s	remarks	above.	He	claims	without	argument	that	








nationism.	 I	believe	we	 stand	 the	best	 chance	of	 solving	 the	Benac-
erraf	Problem	and	 its	 relatives	by	expanding	our	views	about	expla-
nation,	perhaps	to	places	counterfactual	conditions	cannot	follow.	I’ll	
close	 this	section	with	a	very inchoate	gesture	 in	 this	direction.46	As	
noted	 in	 §3,	 Lange	 has	 views	 about	 explanatory	 relations	 between	
45.	 Inadvisable	 for	me,	at	 least;	 if	 you’re	deploying	hypermodal	 conditions	be-
cause	you	have	a	relevant	favored	theory	of	non-causal	explanation,	have	at	
it!
46.	 The	one	 account	 of	 this	 kind	 in	 the	 literature	 I	 know	of	 comes	 from	 John	
Bengson	(2015),	whose	view	implies	that	in	Good Math,	the	fact	that	89	is	
prime	partially constitutes	Lisa’s	belief,	but	that	it	fails	to	similarly	constitute	
Leo’s	 belief	 in	Bad Math.	 Bengson’s	motivating	 discussion	 is	 phenomenal,	
and	a	number	of	the	points	I	make	here	echo	his.	I	find	his	positive	proposal	
unattractively	 limited,	however,	as	 it	names	an	explanatory	relation	(partial	
constitution)	 but	 offers	 no	 account	 whatsoever	 of	 how	 the	 connection	 is	








The	one	unclear	case	 is	Bad Sheep.	There	 is	an	explanatory	con-
nection	between	the	source	of	Mary’s	belief	—	the	sheep-façade	—	and	
the	truth:	the	façade	explains	the	fact	that	there	is	a	sheep	in	the	field.	






In	 cases	 of	 source	 coincidence,	 belief-truth	 coincidences	 obtain	
because	there	are	source-truth	coincidences.	The	explanationist	might	
naturally	suspect	that	some	source-truth	coincidences	likewise	obtain	





































same-cause	—	or,	more	worryingly	 for	 them,	 same-explanation	—	con-
trasts,	while	competitors	face	problems	paralleling	those	raised	in	§6.1.	
To	begin,	 it	will	be	useful	 to	mark	 John	Bengson’s	distinction	be-
tween	source coincidence and	doxastic coincidence (he	says	“accidentality”,	
but	the	terminological	shift	is	harmless):
In	 veridical	 hallucination,	 sensory	 or	 intellectual,	 what	
is	 accidentally	 correct	 is	 a	 potential	 source	 of	 belief	 (a	





Most	 of	 the	 coincidences	 we’ve	 looked	 at	 so	 far	 are	 clear	 cases	
of	 source	 coincidence:	 in	Bad Clock,	 the	 source	of	Bertie’s	 belief	 is	
the	clock;	 in	Bad Math,	 the	source	of	Leo’s	belief	 is	 the	appearance	
of	"89"	on	the	mislabeled	list	of	Fibonacci	numbers;	in	Bad Necessity 
and	Simply Bad,	the	source	of	Eula’s	belief	is	the	randomly	outputting	
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I	am	not	endorsing	 this	view,	but	 I	 think	 it	nicely	 illustrates	 that	
there	are	potential	explanationist	 strategies	 for	accommodating	con-
trasts	 like	 that	between	Bad Sheep	 and	Good Sheep:	 if	 there	 is	 an	
explanatory	 connection	 that	 fails	 to	 eliminate	 coincidence,	 this	 is	
because	avoiding	epistemic	coincidence	 requires	 further explanatory	





















to	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	 a	barn	present.	 Is	 there	 (iii)	 an	 explanatory	
51.	 One	might	 naturally	wonder	whether	 a	 parallel	 strategy	 could	 be	 used	 to	






















the	truth.	 In	Good Sheep,	Bo’s	source	 is	(inference	from)	the	sheep-




more,	 (iii)	 Bo	 relies	 on	 this	 inference	 from	 experience	 precisely	 be-
cause	she	knows	about	the	connection	just	mentioned	(and	is	there-
fore	ex hypothesi	connected	to	it).	
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beside	 her,	 wearing	 a	 real	 diamond,	 with	 the	 habit	 of	
wearing	fakes	on	other	days?	Could	epistemic	contagion	
really	be	so	easy?	(Gendler	and	Hawthorne	2005,	336)
Gendler	and	Hawthorne	 tell	us	 that	 theorists	are	split	on	 the	an-
swers	to	these	questions:	(1)	some	claim	that	Observer	can	know	that	
























travelling	 the	day	after	all	 the	 façades	have	been	 replaced	with	 real	
barns;	would	that	make	Good Barn	a	case	of	coincidence,	too?	
There	may	be	answers	to	these	questions,	in	which	case	something	





Consider	 a	 progression	 of	 cases	 from	 Gendler	 and	 Hawthorne	
(2005).	 They	 discuss	 a	 case	much	 like	Bad Barn	where	 a	 character	
named	Always	walks	around	wearing	a	real	diamond	ring,	along	with	
a	bunch	of	 people	wearing	 fake	ones.	Observer	happens	 to	 look	 at	
Always,	and	forms	the	belief	that	Always	is	wearing	a	diamond	ring.	





53.	 This,	 like	a	number	of	 the	 issues	raised	herein,	 is	related	to	“the	generality	
problem”	for	reliabilism	(e.g.,	Conee	and	Feldman	1998).
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At	the	end	of	the	day,	explanationists	may	not	be	able	to	capture	



















Williamson’s	 second	 reason	 is	 that	knowledge	 is	prime:	 it	 cannot	
be	analyzed	as	a	conjunction	of	internal	and	external	conditions.	This	
falls	squarely	in	line	with	my	arguments.	We	are	interested	in	the	na-







by	 contrast,	 are	 prime:	whether	 there	 is	 an	 explanatory	 connection	







Advocates	 of	 (3)	 differed	 on	 what	 might	 explain	 this	




orientation	within	 it,	 and	 irrelevant	 in	 cases	where	we	
leave	 the	 observer’s	 perceptual	 orientation	 as	 it	 is,	 al-
tering	only	features	of	the	world	around	her.	In	the	first	
sort	of	 case,	one	might	 say,	 the	defeaters	are	 there,	but	
the	observer’s	gaze	happens	not	to	fall	upon	them;	in	the	
second	sort	of	case,	her	gaze	 is	 there,	but	 the	defeaters	
on	which	it	might	have	fallen	happen	not	to	be	around.	




This	 echoes	 concerns	 raised	 about	 counterfactualism	 in	 §6.1.	 It	
is	unclear	how	counterfactualists	can	explain	why	only	one	of	these	
counterfactuals	is	relevant	here,	especially	if	this	isn’t	so	in	other	con-
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are	often	motivated	by	explanatory	 intuitions	 is	 reinforced	by	Fine’s	







































In	my	 view,	 the	 problems	 that	 beset	modalism	 (and	 counterfactual-
ism),	and	speak	in	favor	of	explanationism,	are	not	limited	to	accounts	



















instructed	Kit	 to	 teach	 ethics;	 but	 if	 Robert	 instructs	Kit	 to	 teach	 ethics,	 it	
does	not	seem	to	follow	that	he	has	also	instructed	Kit	to	teach	ethics	or	teach	
metaphysics.	Classical	modal	 semantics	 cannot	 capture	 this	 difference,	 be-
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